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Abstract 
 
Women's struggle for emancipation can be characterized, among other 
elements, as an ongoing process for, first, entering the legal system and 
second, attempting to change it. This, nonetheless, stirs up conflicts and 
certain perplexities, as appropriately summarized by Alejandra Ciriza under 
the label the Wollstonecraft dilemma: the politicization of sexual difference, 
which constitutes the center of feminist struggle in modernity, faces a 
twofold obstacle. On the one hand, the presentation of sexual difference in 
the public sphere leads to the transformation of any question related to it 
into a vindication of rights. On the other hand, the judicialization and 
institutionalization of such demands lead to the recognition of the limits and 
impossibilities of a politics of rights (Ciriza , 2004, p. 210). Given the fact that 
there is this uncontestable and paradoxical relationship between women's 
political struggle for equality and the legal system, this paper aims to 
evaluate a specific approach to law, that is, Luhmann's account of law as a 
social system from a feminist perspective. The question guiding the 
discussion proposed here is the following: is the theory of law as a social 
system able to incorporate feminist contentions to law? In order to do so, 
the Luhmaniann theoretical framework and its most important concepts is 
presented and discussed. Then, this framework is reviewed through a 
feminist perspective, particularly by the confrontation with a feminist 
agenda of law that is based primarily on feminist legal theory and theories 
of patriarchy. At the end, I hope to accomplish the twofold intention of thi s 
paper: first, to point the limits of Luhmann's approach to law from a feminist 
standpoint and, second, to show the relevance of gender analysis in the 
legal field. 
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Introduction: the relationship between law and women’s struggle 
for equality 
 
In modernity, women's struggle for equity and emancipation has always had a 
strong and conflicting relationship with law. During the American Revolution, more 
precisely in the year of the Second Continental Congress (1776), Abigail Adams wrote a 
letter to her husband, John Adams, that would later became famous, in which she asks 
the lawmakers of the Congress to “remember the ladies” in the new Code of Laws, 
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otherwise, they were “determined to foment a Rebellion”, for they would not obey any 
law in which they have no voice or representation (Rossi, 1988, p. 10-11). 
Some years later, during the French Revolution, there was another example of 
women claiming their rights. The document called Declaration of the Rights of Woman 
and Female Citizen was proposed for the Constitutional French Assembly, in 1791, by 
Marie Gouze, who at that time adopted the name Olympe de Gouges to sign her 
petitions and papers used as political ads. Despite the extremely transformative 
character of that moment in France, the revolutionaries were not capable of going far 
enough to recognize women as citizens. Olympe was beheaded in 1793 being 
condemned as a counter revolutionary and stigmatized as a subversive woman.         
Interestingly enough, at the same time yet in another place, given the influence 
of “the climate of political commotion generated by the French Revolution” (Ciriza, 
2004, p. 207), another woman vindicated the right to participate in the political order. 
In 1792, in London, Mary Wollstonecraft published A vindication of the rights of 
woman. Positioning herself against Rousseau, Wollstonecraft harshly criticized the 
patriarchal society and assumed a perspective of difference considering women's 
position in society. Alejandra Ciriza (2004) argues that Wollstonecraft demonstrated 
how women's place in society – characterized by subordination and denied access to 
social goods and spaces – was a direct result of how corporal differences were 
transformed into complementary and hierarchically structured gender roles.  
In Brazil, some years later, precisely in 1833, in Recife, Nísia Floresta published 
her first book. It was, as Constância Lima Duarte has shown (1997), “also the first one 
in Brazil that dealt with women's right to education and work”. In addition, it 
“demanded women to be considered as intelligent beings and worthy of society's 
respect” (Duarte, 1997). The referred book, The rights of women and the injustice of 
men, was inspired by Wollstonecraft, Poulain de La Barre, Sophie and Olympe de 
Gouges' works (Duarte, 1997) and played a very important role in Brazilian feminist 
history. From this great beginning, there were many others audacious appearances of 
Brazilian women who, individually or collectively, turned the feminist struggle into a 
struggle for rights. 
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These simple and varied historical references are able to demonstrate that 
across the world, women’s struggle for emancipation can be characterized, among 
other elements, as an ongoing process for, firstly, an entrance into the legal system and 
secondly, attempts to change it. This, nonetheless, stirs up conflicts and certain 
perplexities, as appropriately summarized by Alejandra Ciriza under the label “the 
Wollstonecraft dilemma”: the politicization of sexual difference, which constitutes the 
center of feminist struggle in modernity, faces a twofold obstacle. On the one hand, the 
presentation of sexual difference in the public sphere leads to the transformation of 
any question related to it into a vindication of rights. On the other hand, the 
judicialization and institutionalization of such demands lead to a clear consciousness of 
the limits and impossibilities of a ‘politics of rights’ (Ciriza, 2004, p. 210). 
Given the fact that there is this uncontestable and paradoxical relationship 
between women’s political struggle for equality and the legal system, this paper aims 
to evaluate a specific approach to law, that is, Luhmann’s account of “law as a social 
system” from a feminist perspective. The question that will  guide the discussion 
proposed here is the following: is the theory of law as a social system able to 
incorporate feminist contentions to law? In order to do so, the Luhmaniann theoretical 
framework and its most important concepts will be presented and dis cussed. Then, the 
framework will be reviewed through a feminist perspective, particularly by the 
confrontation with a feminist agenda of law that is based primarily on feminist legal 
theory studies and theories of patriarchy. At the end, I hope to be able to accomplish 
the twofold intention of this paper: firstly, to point the limits of Luhmann’s approach 
to law from a feminist standpoint and, secondly, to show the relevance of gender 
analysis into the legal field. 
Before turning to Luhmann’s theory, let me clarify what I mean by a feminist 
perspective. First, it is necessary to recognize that many different approaches fall 
under the label feminist theory and they are framed upon different concepts, notions 
and hypotheses. Nevertheless, “they generally share certain basic commitments. At 
the substantive level, feminism presupposes a commitment to equality between the 
sexes. At the methodological level, it implies a commitment to gender as a focus of 
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analysis and to approaches that reflect women’s perspectives  and concerns” (Rhode, 
1994, p. 1182). It is from this standpoint that this paper departures . 
 
Law as a social system: an overview of Luhmann’s theory of 
society and law 
 
Luhmann (2008, 1988) builds his theory of society and law using concepts from 
the evolutionary theory, but combines them with other ones that come from the 
theory of difference. His attempt is to make the concept of evolution more precise, for 
it had already been used in the legal field, but, by his account, without any accuracy. In 
order to do so, he borrows the concept of evolution from Darwin’s theory and makes it 
clear that evolution is not a synonym of progress. On the contrary, it is a complex 
process of both differentiation and adaptation, which occurs in the relationship 
between system and environment. It is inevitable, in the sense that it cannot be 
stopped, and it is also improbable, in the sense that it is not possible to guide evolution 
beforehand, in the direction one wants. 
Thus, Luhmann describes the evolution of modern societies as a functional 
differentiation process, through which societal structuring elements that once were 
undifferentiated detach one from the other and form autopoietic specialized systems. 
Society is thus described as a complex social system, whose different functions are 
carried out by differentiated sub-systems. In sum, for Luhmann, social evolution is 
conceived as a differentiation process of social sub-systems with specific functions.  
Given that, Luhmann turns to the question of which characteristics of a system 
make evolution possible. And he answers that it would be “the pressure of selection 
that arises from the operative closure of systems and their limited complexity in 
relation to the world” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 232). He is working with the concept of an 
autopoietic system, which means a system that is self-reproductive or, in other terms, 
a system that establishes its own forms of production and that does not depend on 
external elements to reproduce itself. Then, the systems he is describing evolve 
because the world becomes more complex along time and requires from them new 
and different responses, which they give in their own terms. It is also important to 
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clarify that, in Luhmann’s account, each system operates under a binary code and 
everything that enters the system must be translated in terms of its guiding code. 
For Luhmann, law is such a kind of system, or better said, a social sub-system, 
whereas society is a social system where one can find functionally differentiated sub-
systems. It has the function of processing “normative expectations that are capable of 
maintaining themselves in situations of conflict” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 140), providing 
thus cohesion to social life through the reduction of complexity of the alternatives of 
actions. Law accomplishes this task by protecting expectations for it contains 
preliminary decisions for the conflicts that can emerge within society. In order to 
protect these expectations, the legal system developed a binary code: legal x illegal. In 
this sense, everything that gets inside the legal system will be labeled according to this 
code “and anything that does not fit into this code is of legal significance only if it is 
important as a preliminary question in decisions about justice and injustice” (Luhmann, 
1988, p. 140).  
According to Luhmann, this coding has two important functions: firstly, it 
permits the legal system to perform its function within society, through the 
codification of each disappointed expectation that enters it; secondly, it “serves the 
autopoietic reproduction of the system”, in the sense that “it makes it possible to 
examine all processing of normative expectations in terms of the key question whether 
or not the processing is compatible with previous processing” (Luhmann, 1988, 140). 
Through this mechanism, law not only regulates its own regulation, but also 
determines its own modification. Furthermore, it establishes its own mechanism of 
evaluation. (Luhmann, 1988, p. 141). 
The legal system has, thus, “a self-referential, closed character” (Luhmann, 
1988, p. 141) and for that its boundaries are defined “at the operative level”, “by the 
legal system itself” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 141). In this sense, “every communication that 
makes a legal assertion or raises a defense against such an assertion is an internal 
operation of the legal system” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 141), and for that has to follow the 
binary coding lawful/unlawful. 
However, a long process of evolution unfolded until the legal system finally 
gained the autopoietic character given to it by Luhmann. In addition, this was an 
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independent evolution, because the thesis of an independent autopoiesis of the legal 
system leads to the affirmation of an independent evolution of the legal system. 
Luhmann describes this evolution in three different stages – archaic law, law of the 
ancient cultures and positive law (Luhmann, 1983) – and calls attention to varied 
innovations which occurred throughout the course of history.   
One of the evolutionary changes deeply discussed by Luhmann is the existence 
of written records or the invention of writing and its impact within the legal system. 
The author describes how writing influenced changes in the legal system, the different 
usages of writing inside it, the relevance of writing for the validity of law – as a 
condition of validity itself - and how writing contributed to the development of a 
particular specialized group responsible for interpreting it.  
Another decisive deviation for the evolution of the legal system pointed by 
Luhmann “[…] occurred when in the proceedings […] arguments were no longer made 
exclusively ad hoc and ad hominem” ((Luhmann, 2008, p. 248). Law gained autonomy 
from the social structures outside the legal system, especially class -related status and 
familial relationships, friendships, and patronage; and then differentiated itself from 
morals, common sense, and everyday use of words. When these arguments that come 
from sources placed outside the law are no longer permitted as valid ones, a demand 
for justification arises and it contributes to the emergence of a concept of justice in the 
following terms: equal cases must be treated equally and different cases, unequally. 
Another development that can be seen as a sort of result of this change is the 
differentiation of special roles for legal experts, for lawyers.  
Another point stressed by Luhmann is the relevance of legal dogmatics to the 
stabilization and restabilization of law, because it “guarantees that the legal system 
approves itself in its change as a system” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 257). Legislation is also 
considered a “sort of innovation for the fixing of defects” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 258); 
with it, law has its own mechanism to change itself, without being necessary to count 
on external sources. The consequence of this evolution is that there is only positive 
law: law which the legal system itself implements with the symbol of legal validity. 
Moreover, the concept of subjective rights was also an important achievement of the 
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evolution of law, especially the idea of universal subjective rights, which destroyed the 
basis of stratified society and the very notion of rights linked to social status.       
Finally, Luhmann points out the role interpretation plays in the evolutionary 
process of law, as it “performs a consistency test by examining which meaning of a 
norm fits in the context of other norms” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 260). This is in fact the last 
step of the evolutionary path of law, for from this development on law can be changed 
through interpretation, without necessarily having to change its text. At this point 
then, law can be characterized as a completely differentiated and autopoietic social 
system which has the specific function of stabilizing expectations by pre-establishing 
solutions to possible conflicts.   
Besides being autopoietic and autonomous, law is also operatively closed, 
which means that the legal system specifies its own structures by its operations and 
change them if events, internally identified, so demand. Nevertheless, this operative 
closure does not mean that the legal system does not interact with other systems. 
Examining these interactions, Luhmann pays close attention to two other social 
systems: politics and economy.  
Though dependent of each other, law, politics and economy are different sub-
systems of society, each guided by their own code. They can be considered different 
sub-systems of society due to their autopoieses: each of them defines “the elements 
that are allowed to operate within a network of operations, by the network of its own 
operations” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 378). Even though, as already noticed, the 
differentiation of the systems does not mean that there are no relations between 
them. On the contrary, there are many relations – as already pointed out – and each 
system has been able to develop by conditioning and stimulating each other. This is 
possible because of both the separation of systems and the existence of a mechanism 
of their structural coupling. 
The legal system is coupled with the political and the economic systems, 
respectively, by the constitution, the property and the contract. These forms of 
structural coupling “reduce and so facilitate influences of the environment on the 
system” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 382). 
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It is important to notice that Luhmann rejects natural law theories, which 
means that he opposes those theories that assume there are universally valid rules for 
the whole society. Seeing law as a social system means to characterize law as a 
dependent variable of the society (just as the society is also a dependent variable of 
law).  In other words, law evolves in relation to the development and changes of 
society and the rules are created as a demand from the society in order to solve social 
problems. But it also signifies that the changes that have occurred within the legal 
system impact the evolution of the society. Nevertheless, “it does not mean that the 
environment [that is, society] determines the legal system. Rather, the legal system 
notices defects only in its own devices and fixes them with its own means” (Luhmann, 
2008, p. 258). In a very basic sense, law is autopoietic and always contingent. What 
society does is only give accidental impulses, which causes variations and innovative 
selections.    
In summary, law is a subsystem of society, among other subsystems such as 
politics, economy, religion, education, and so on, that is to say, “the legal system is a 
differentiated functional system within society” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 138) and, thus, can 
not be equated to the other mentioned sub-systems. This assumption leads to the 
conclusion that when law is reproducing itself – a process named as autopoiesis – it is 
actually also reproducing the entire social system. To perform this ability, law resorts 
to forms of communication that can be understood outside its own sphere. The 
existing connection between law and society is thus twofold: firstly, the legal system 
has a specific role in the social system, that is, it performs a differentiated function for 
society, and, secondly, “the legal system participates in society’s construction of 
reality” (Luhmann, 1988, p. 138). 
Law is both dependent and independent from society. This means, in the 
theory of social system, that law depends on its environment – that is, society – to 
grow, but, at the same time, it is autonomous when its own operations are concerned, 
which means that the legal system decides for itself what is legal and what is illegal 
and, to do that, it must appeal to its own operations. 
According to Luhmann (1988, p. 138), accessing the social character of law 
requires the acceptance of two conceptual innovations: (1) the notion of 
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differentiation, which establishes that the systems differentiate themselves from the 
environment and establish relationships with it; (2) this differentiation between 
systems and environment and their respective operations is only possible because the 
first establish a closure that is self-referential, which means that it sets its own terms 
of production and reproduction.  
Finally, with his idea of “a full differentiation of the legal system [that] leads to 
the universalization of its code” (Luhmann, 2008, p. 273), Luhmann builds the notion 
that there are no limitations outside the legal system of what is going to be integrated 
in it: limitation is only self-limitation, which is to say, it is the legal system itself which 
establishes what is going to be subject to law and what is not going to be so. 
 
Is the concept of law as a social system open to feminist 
contentions? 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, “Luhmann’s perspective contends 
that the production and evolution of law cannot be attributed to extra-legal 
influences” (Deflem, 1998, p. 786), due to the fact that it is a closed self-referentiated 
system. Furthermore, there is an important hypothesis backing Luhmann’s theory: that 
the transition from traditional to modern society was a transition from a stratified 
differentiated social system to a functionally differentiated social system, which 
means, the traditional society was organized through familial and tribal ties, while, in 
modern society, the organization occurs through the differentiation of sub-systems, 
each of them tied to a particular function and structured upon a specific binary code 
(Cornell, 1991, p. 793). 
From a feminist perspective, the assumptions stated above are at the very least 
problematic, because they completely disregard the fact that there is still a patriarchal 
system which operates in different social spheres, maintaining or even deepening 
women’s subordination. Moreover, the structural elements of this patriarchal system 
can be identified in different sub-systems described by Luhmann and are all of them, 
to varying degrees, connected to the legal system, via some kind of regulation or even 
non-regulation. Let me clarify this point in a more detailed manner.  
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Sylvia Walby defines patriarchy “as a system of social structures and practices 
in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (Walby, 1990, p. 20). By using 
the term social structure she wants to both banish any possibility of patriarchy being 
read in a biological determinist perspective and to establish that neither is every man 
nor is every woman, respectively, in the position of oppressor and oppressed. Still 
according to Walby, patriarchy can be assessed from two different levels, one more 
abstract and another less abstract. At the first level, “it exists as a system of social 
relations”; at the second one, “it is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of 
production, patriarchal relations of paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male 
violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural 
institutions” (Walby, 1990, p. 20). The identification of these six different bases of 
patriarchy is important because it guarantees the necessary analytical instrument to 
assess a reality that is increasingly complex and thus avoids reductionism and 
essentialism. Although analytically distinct and relatively autonomous at the operative 
level, these elements “have effects upon each other, both reinforcing and blocking” 
(Walby, 1990, p. 20). They also vary in time and space and must be analyzed in a deep 
way according to different contexts. In order to address the question posed at the 
beginning of this paper, I will relate each of these elements of the patriarchy system to 
the legal system, aiming to show the problems that emerge from treating the latter as 
self-referentiated and thus not impacted by the first.   
The patriarchal production relations in the household can be defined as the 
way through which “women’s household labour is expropriated by their husbands or 
cohabitees” (Walby, 1990, p. 21). As many research reports have demonstrated (such 
as Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, 2009), women are, even when they dedicate 
themselves to some type of paid job, the ones responsible for the major part of the 
housework and caretaking. How does this then relate to the legal system, since 
household labor happens inside the private sphere and does not seem not to be an 
issue for legal regulation? Amidst many other instances, there is a strong vindication 
from women’s and feminist movements for the recognition of unpaid household labor, 
by the social security and retirement systems, on the issue of assuring stipends. This 
vindication is based on the fact that women dedicate an overwhelming part of their 
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lives to these activities, which are, nevertheless, invisible. In the US, for example, 
according to the analysis of the Time Use Survey provided by Rachel Krantz-Kent (2009, 
p. 48), during the years 2003 to 2007, “women spent an average of 6.3 hours more per 
week doing household activities than did men (15.5 versus 9.2 hours) and 2.4 hours 
more per week providing care to household members (4.4 versus 2.0 hours)”. In 
Luhmann’s account, it would be read just as an irritation which the legal system did 
not make the choice to convert into legal terms of lawful/unlawful. This perspective, 
certainly, only serves to cover how the patriarchal system helps to maintain the sexual 
division of labor and to legitimate the lesser value attributed to women’s activities.  
The second element, patriarchal relations within paid work, is explained by 
Walby (1990, p. 21) as those mechanisms which “exclude women from the better 
forms of work and segregate them into the worse jobs which are deemed to be less 
skilled”. The relationship between this element of the patriarchal system and law 
seems to be clear. On the one hand, many countries, for they have recognized the 
impact of gender within the labor market, which means that they explicitly 
corroborated Walby’s assertion of an existence of patriarchal relation in the work 
place, passed affirmative action laws in order to guarantee equal opportunities for 
women in this sphere. These laws are not gender blind and explicitly address issues 
that are outside the legal system and do not obey the code lawful/unlawful, that is to 
say, the mechanisms outside the legal system which prevent women from getting the 
better job positions. On the other hand, as Joanne Conaghan has already 
demonstrated, “labour law is a world made up of full-time male bread-winners and the 
legal rules reflect this conception of the worker” (Conaghan, 1995, p. 345). With this 
statement, she aims exactly to show that when labor law claims a gender neutral 
approach – which seems to be the Luhmannian perspective – it actually embraces a 
male standpoint, for it does not admit that sexual differences play an important role in 
the labor place. In this sense, there is a tense relationship between labor law and 
patriarchy: some advances from a feminist perspective can be pointed out in this 
branch of law, but they occurred only in those circumstances that the patriarchal 
conceptions which dominate this legal field, as asserted by Conaghan, were explicitly 
recognized and addressed. 
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The third structuring element of the patriarchy system pointed by Walby (1990, 
p. 21) is the state, which “has a systematic bias towards patriarchal interests in its 
policies and actions”. The connection of this element and law seems to be explicit: for 
Luhmann, law is positive law, which means, law is that body of norms produced by the 
state according to a previously established procedure. If this is so and if the state has a 
patriarchal bias when planning and executing its policies and actions, the legal system 
will, to a lesser or greater extent, embody this same bias, in the way feminist legal 
scholarship has demonstrated (MacKinnon, 1983). One example usually pointed by 
feminist theorists are the welfare policies, which stigmatize women as recipients of 
state’s help and do not provide them with the necessary means to overcoming their 
disadvantaged position.      
Male violence, the fourth element, “constitutes a further structure, despite its 
apparently individualistic and diverse form. It is behaviour routinely experienced by 
women from men, with standard effects upon the actions of most women” (Walby, 
1990, p. 21). In this issue, law definitively plays a very important role. It should be 
noted that for quite a long period of time, violence against women was not even 
deemed a legal concern. There was no specific regulation on this matter and, for this 
reason, many women lost their lives. After many years of feminist struggle, different 
countries around the world passed acts expressly directed at confronting violence 
against women and, just as the affirmative action acts mentioned before, they are not 
gender blinded. Moreover, they represent the result of a strong social movement 
pressuring the state in order to produce such type of norms.      
The maintenance of patriarchal relations in sexuality, whose key forms are 
“compulsory heterosexuality and the sexual double standard are two of the key forms 
of this structure” (Walby, 1990, p. 21), constitutes the fifth element. Once more, the 
relationship between this element of the patriarchal and the legal systems seems to be 
very clear. In different countries of the world, there is an ongoing struggle of the LGBT 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and transgender) movement to pass laws which 
enfranchise same-sex couples with the right to marry. This vindication is necessary 
because most of the Western democracies only recognize the right to get married to 
different-sex couples. Why so? Is it only a question of a self-referentiated legal system 
Leviathan | Notes on Political Research N. 6, pp.1-17, 2013 
 
13 
which decided to code different-sex marriage as legal and same-sex marriage as 
illegal? In a gender perspective, the answer is no. This norm actually incorporates, or 
better said, legalizes a compulsory heterosexuality norm that guides the Western 
patriarchal society and that is why pressures from outside the legal system have so 
little acceptance.   
And, finally, the sixth element is the patriarchal cultural institutions, “composed 
of a set of institutions which create the representation of women within a patriarchal 
gaze in variety of arenas, such as religions, education and the media” (Walby, 1990, p. 
21). These institutions play a very important role in shaping subjectivities which are 
gender-differentiated or, in other words, they create some standards of what it means 
to be a man and what it means to be a woman and, by doing this, they help to 
maintain the patriarchal system as whole. The relationship between them and the law 
can be established in the following way: the standards created by those institutions 
inform the production of law – just remember the cases of labor law and violence 
against women – and law can function both as a tool which reinforces or challenges 
them.  
Once demonstrated the relationships each of the different elements of the 
patriarchy system establish with the legal system, it is necessary to clarify that the 
theorists of patriarchy do not state it is an unchangeable entity. On the contrary, as 
claimed by Walby, “we need to separate the notion of progress in the position of 
women from that of changes in the form of gender inequality. […] There have been 
major alterations in the form of patriarchy as well as in its degree1” (Walby, 1990, p. 
23). It means that all those elements are subjected to transformation and that is why a 
substantial inquiry on women’s situation within society demands a deep analysis of 
how each of them are actually functioning. As an example of these type of changes is 
the fact that wages and education gaps between men and women have decreased in 
almost all western democracies due to, firstly, a strong struggle of feminist and 
                                                 
1 According to Walby (1990, p. 174), “degrees of patriarchy refers to the intensity of oppression on a 
specified dimension”, such as education or wage. Forms of patriarchy, on the other hand, refer “to the 
overall  type of patriarchy, as defined by the specifi c relations between the different patriarchal 
structures” (1990, p. 174). Here, Walby makes the distinction between public patriarchy, which “is based 
principally in public sites such as employment and the state” and private patriarchy, maintained “upon 
household production as the main site of women’s oppression” (Walby, 1990, p. 24). 
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women’s movement and, secondly, the implementation of policies that definitely are 
not gender blind.  
Then, what is problematic in the Luhmannian approach? Luhmann’s theory 
explicitly “denies the relevance of extra-legal contexts conditioning the operation of 
law” (Deflem, 1998, p. 786) and, for this reason, pressures which come from outside 
the legal system are characterized only as “irritation”. Once they enter the legal 
system, they must be translated into the binary code lawful/unlawful. 
As I tried to show above, feminist contentions to law demonstrate that 
Luhmann’s description does not correspond to the reality of the production or the 
application of law. If in earlier times, women could not even establish civil contracts 
with their own names because they were not entitled basic civil rights, today Western 
legal systems have changed and guaranteeing that women can take part in the life of 
democratic polities as citizens. Nevertheless, Pateman argues that “this change alone 
does not alter the patriarchal ‘foundation’ of the myths which justify civil society” 
(Cornell, 1991, p. 788). In this sense, Pateman shows how “the social contract is itself 
contaminated by patriarchy” and “why ‘neutral’ language in law will itself not be 
‘neutral’ at all, but an expression of the gender hierarchy” (Cornell, 1991, p. 790). She 
demonstrates “why it is so difficult to sustain and justify legal reform under the 
traditional concepts of the legal system” (Cornell , 1991, p. 790), since the dismantling 
of traditional gender hierarchies or of patriarchy has not occurred. In Pateman’s 
account:  
 
The juridical equality and legal reform so central to contract doctrine (and 
which, contrary to the impression cultivated on all sides, has not yet been 
completely achieved) is invariably seen today as a matter of women acting 
like men. The suffrage, and more recent reforms such as the participation of 
women on juries, equal-pay and anti-discrimination legislation, reform of 
marriage and rape law, decriminalization of prostitution, are all seen as 
allowing women to become citizens like men and owners of property in their 
persons like men (Pateman, 1988, p. 227). 
 
For this reason, a feminist legal theory approach seems to be more adequate to 
address women’s issues than Luhmman’s perspective, at least, in the current situation 
experienced by Western legal systems. From an analytical standpoint, feminist legal 
theory firmly establishes that sex/gender is an important type of social structure which 
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characterizes and influences the production, the content and the interpretation of law. 
From the ethical-political perspective, it states that biological differences were misused 
to produce a social differentiation among people and designated women to a 
subordinated, oppressed and despised place. In this process, law functions as an 
important mechanism for producing and reproducing gender inequality. And, finally, 
considering methodology, feminist legal theory does not assume a dogmatic attitude2 
toward its object. On the contrary, it is characterized by a critical scrutiny of law and 
legal practices, made possible by the always present linkage between theory and 
practice.   
Hence, academic law feminists conduct their research in a manner that is 
capable of showing how law is both gendered and not neutral, seeking to demonstrate 
the existing link between law and the condition of subaltern woman, in order to 
promote social change. In this theoretical field, law is seen as a byproduct of the social 
construction of reality. As Deborah L. Rhode argues (1989, p. 2), “law is an important 
social text, which illuminates as well as influences the cultural construction of gender”. 
Consequently, it becomes an instrument that can reinforce stereotyped gender roles, 
‘legalizing’ through its discourse, inequalities. Yet it may very well contribute to the 
production of a more egalitarian context. In this sense, it would function as a catalyst 
seeking to overcome gender dominance. 
What feminist legal theory provides is exactly what is missing in the 
Luhmannian approach, that is, the demonstration of the undeniable relationships that 
exist between the legal system and the patriarchal system. Although Luhmann 
recognizes that impulses exist from outside the legal system, he firmly sustains that 
“modern law is at the level of its own operation completely autonomous and closed” 
(Deflem, 1998, p. 784) and, for this reason, legal changes only occur “because of 
changes within the legal subsystem itself” (Deflem, 1998, p. 784). This account firmly 
denies that pressures which come outside the legal system not only propel towards 
change but actually shape these changes. And the vindicated equality between men 
and women inside the legal system will occur only when women’s equal standing is 
                                                 
2 It is important to note here that the dogmatic perspective, characterized as accepting positive norms as 
a presupposition that is unquestionable in any investigation, is str ongly privileged in academic studies 
within Brazil ian Law. 
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“accepted as an expression of the freedom of women as women, and not treated as an 
indication that women can be just like men” (Walby, 1990, p. 231). 
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